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Withdrawal of Life Support:
Conflict Among Patient Wishes, Family,
Physicians, Courts and Statutes, and the Law
LYNDA M. TARANTINO*
INTRODUCTION
Advances in technology and medicine now enable physicians
and machines to keep people alive who would have died just a few
years ago.' Often machines artificially maintain the lives of those
who will never regain consciousness, who will never be able to func-
tion again on their own, people who have no hope for a quality of life
even close to what most of us would consider "living." In certain cir-
cumstances physicians automatically follow life-sustaining proto-
cols, perhaps because the future health of their patients is some-
times uncertain. Unfortunately, once life support measures are
taken they are often difficult to discontinue without the involvement
of physicians, ethics committees, courts, families and even strang-
ers. Although many patients benefit from current advances, it is also
becoming more common for patients to become "prisoner[s] of tech-
nology" who must undergo a difficult, complicated, and drawn out
process simply to be allowed to die with dignity, and on their own
terms.2
* J.D., University at Buffalo School of Law, May 1994. Cited laws are current
through March 28, 1994. As the laws in this area are changing rapidly, any reliance on ci-
tations in this article should be confirmed. The author wishes to thank fellow Buffalo Law
Review Editors Paul Raimondi and Sharon Swift for their many contributions to this ar-
ticle.
1. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990);
Michele Yuen, Letting Daddy Die: Adopting New Standards for Surrogate Decision Mak-
ing, 39 UCLA L. REV. 581, 583, 587 (1992).
When Americans died in 1950, the majority died at home with their families in at-
tendance. Now, of the approximately 5500 Americans who die each day, 80% do so "wired
and incubated in an institution where the expensive technology is arrayed and controlled
by specialists who likely know little about the patient beyond the medical problem." Id. at
n.33 (quoting Andrew H. Malcolm, Reassessing Care of Dying: Policy Seen Evolving from
AMA. Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1986, at col. 1); see also, Letters to the Editors,
based on case presentation by Lisa L. Kirkland, Brain Death and the Termination of Life
Support: Case and Analysis, J. OF CLINICAL ETHICS, SPRING 1992, at 78-82.
2. American Academy of Neurology in amicus brief for Cruzan v. Harmon, et al, 760
S.W.2d 408,423 (Mo. 1988), affd, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); BRUCE HILTON, FIRST Do No HARM
17 (1991).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health3, the Su-
preme Court recognized the right of competent individuals to refuse
medical treatment. However, the Court left unclear the rights of an
individual who is unable to make his or her own life support deci-
sions, as well as the rights of family members to decide these issues.
The Court invited states to clarify this new area of law.4 In the last
few years every state has enacted some form of advance directive
legislation, and most have changed definitions and added guidelines
and restrictions in related areas. While recent legislation has given
us all more freedom over our bodies, many statutes do not do
enough. Countless inconsistencies between states, and even within a
state's own legislation, confuse and provoke unnecessary court bat-
tles. Many statutes still offer no relief to incompetent patients in a
permanent comatose state if they have given no clear indication of
their treatment wishes. This Note examines how state laws have
changed to reflect medicine's new abilities in the area of treatment
decisions and how the statutes serve both to resolve and encourage
conflict in health care decision-making. Part I attempts to define
many new medical and legal terms in the context of the right to
forego life-sustaining medical treatment. Part H examines the role of
physicians and hospitals and how their policies, feelings and obliga-
tions may conflict with patient rights and influence court decisions.
Part III explores the issues of conflict among patient directives,
designated health care agents, state statutes and the courts in deci-
sions to withdraw life support. Part IV examines the role of the
family in life support decisions, and the conflict which may arise
both among family members and between family and patient wishes.
Finally, Part V suggests solutions for preventing disagreeable legal
and ethical conflicts in the future.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Life Support
The terms "life support system" or "life-sustaining procedure"
have been defined by virtually every state. At the very least, the
terms encompass any medical procedure or intervention which,
when applied to an individual, would serve only to postpone the
moment of death.5 However, even this simple definition is subject to
3. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
4. Id. at 289-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
5. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.101(11) (West Supp. 1993)(Florida now uses the
term "life-prolonging procedure"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, §40/10 (Smith-Hurd 1993); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §5-701(b)(4) (West 1991 & Supp. 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. §90-
321(a)(2) (1992); 1993 OR. LAWS, ch. 767, sec. 1, §127.505(9); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 70.122.020(5)(West 1992 & Supp. 1993).
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controversy, since some statutes still exempt or differentiate artifi-
cial nutrition and hydration6 from other life-sustaining procedures.'
This distinction is at odds with a great deal of medical research and
writing, and much of our case law.' Nearly every state's final court
to consider the issue has concluded that artificial feeding is medical
treatment which may be refused.9 However, many statutes either do
not allow, or make it difficult for, an incompetent patient to refuse
artificial nutrition and hydration. Additionally, some statutes state
that life support may include any procedure that maintains an in-
dividual in a state of permanent unconsciousness. 10 The effect of a
definition encompassing any procedure maintaining permanent un-
consciousness is to allow withdrawal of nutrition and hydration,
thereby erasing the distinction made by many states.
Many people, as reflected in at least half of our state statutes,
feel more of an emotional or moral distaste in discontinuing artifi-
cial nutrition and hydration than in discontinuing other forms of life
support. This seems odd since most people now accept the discon-
nection of a ventilator and think carefully about even starting arti-
ficial respiration. Certainly the need for air is at least as basic and
necessary as the need for food and water, yet not a single statute
places limitations specifically on the disconnection of respirators.
Currently, the distinctions statutes place on artificial nutrition and
hydration only serve to put an additional, unnecessary limitation on
physicians and families who have already decided that a patient has
no hope and have already removed all other forms of life support. In
fact, the nutrition and hydration problems encountered in many
states serve to defeat the purpose of many statutes to allow a digni-
fied death and prevent the hopeless prolonging of life.
B. Persistent Vegetative State versus Terminally Ill
"Persistent Vegetative State" [hereinafter PVS] is a relatively
new medical term which has been adopted by the courts. PVS is
6. Any subsequent reference to nutrition and hydration is meant to refer to artificial
nutrition and hydration which is mechanically administered.
7. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-36-4-1 (West Supp. 1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. §404.820 (Supp.
1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321 (1993). Maine, Oregon, North Dakota and Ohio have re-
cently changed their statutes so that artificial nutrition and hydration are no longer ex-
empt from their definitions of life support. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §5-701(b)(4)
(West Supp. 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-02(4) (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1337.13 (Anderson 1989 & Supp. 1991); 1993 OR. LAWS ch. 767 sec. 1, § 127.505(9).
8. See infra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
9. In re Guardianship of L.W. v. L.E. Phillips Career Development Center, 482
N.W.2d 60, 66 (Wis. 1992).
10. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-570(1) (West Supp. 1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755,
§40/10 (Smith-Hurd 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.2(5) (West 1992).
1994] 625
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used to describe those who are not terminally ill but are, for a rea-
sonably long period of time," in an unconscious or semi-unconscious
state wherein the patient has no awareness, impaired brain func-
tions, and practically no chance of recovery."
"Terminally ill" must also be defined for a complete under-
standing of many statutes; although the term seems clear at first
glance, it may mean different things to different people and different
states. The state of Maine has defined terminal illness as "an incur-
able or irreversible condition from which, in the opinion of the at-
tending physician, death will occur without the use of life-sustaining
procedures." 3 This definition, as are similar definitions in other
states, is ambiguous since it depends on the definition of "life-sus-
taining procedures." Therefore, if nutrition and hydration are ex-
cluded from the definition of "life-sustaining procedures,' 4 most pa-
tients in a PVS are not considered "terminally ill" and, therefore, are
frequently denied the right to refuse life support. Other statutes de-
fine "terminal condition" as an "incurable condition caused by in-
jury, disease or illness which, regardless of the application of life-
sustaining procedures, would within reasonable medical judgment
produce death..."."5 Consequently, when statutes use the term
"terminally ill" or require that death be "imminent" before life sup-
port is withdrawn, it is frequently done only to distinguish the with-
11. "According to the Guidelines, [for State Court Decision Making in Authorizing or
Withholding Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, National Center for State Courts 19911
an accurate diagnosis of persistent vegetative state is usually considered to be possible
only after three months." In re Guardianship of L.W. v. L.E. Phillips Career Development
Center, 482 N.W.2d 60, 64 (Wis. 1992).
12. According to Bernat:
[tihe persistent vegetative state (PVS) is a tragic neurological condition charac-
terized by wakefulness without awareness. The typical patient has suffered pro-
found damage to hemispheric cortical neurons, which is sufficient to abolish
awareness of self and environment [including pain] but largely spares the brain
stem ascending reticular activating neurons, thus not impairing wakefulness.
James L. Bernat, The Boundaries of the Persistent Vegetative State, J. OF CLINICAL
ETHICS, 1992, at 176. PVS patients appear to have sleep/wake patterns and may have
some primitive responses to stimuli, but are blind and unaware. They are usually respira-
tor independent, do not feel pain, and may live in this state for years or even decades. Id.
at 177; In re Guardianship, 482 N.W. 2d at 60, 64.
13. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, §35/2(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18-A §5-701(b)(9)(West Supp. 1993).
14. Stating that the administration of food and water is not a life-sustaining proce-
dure seems a contradiction in terms. For further discussion on this conflict see infra notes
59-67 and accompanying text.
15. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 §3080.2 -.4 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993) (requiring, in
some cases, a terminal illness to be in its final stage before nutrition and hydration may
be withdrawn, and defining "final stage" as the last stage of a terminal illness or injury in
which, even with the use of medical treatment, the person with the terminal illness or in-
jury is in the dying process and will die within a reasonably short time).
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drawal of nutrition and hydration from other forms of life support,
especially since many patients receiving artificial nutrition and hy-
dration will not die reasonably soon.16 In these instances, the termi-
nal illness requirement serves to prohibit the withdrawal of nutri-
tion and hydration where the patient will die solely from dehydra-
tion or starvation rather than from the existing terminal condition.
These terms, when used to define what kind of patient may refuse
life support, appear to be misleading and often breed confusion. For
instance, Louisiana's and Florida's statutes require that a patient
must be "terminal" before s/he may discontinue life support. Most
people consider a "terminally ill" patient to be one who will die in
the near future. However, the statute later defines "terminal" as a
condition which may include patients in a PVS, who may live for
years and who do not necessarily have a specific illness that will
cause death. 7
C. Incompetency
While Cruzan firmly established the right of a competent per-
son to refuse life support, Nancy Cruzan's competency was not at is-
sue. To most of us, it would seem that a patient who is conscious,
with no brain injuries or evidence of senility, has the right to refuse
medical treatment. However, even if a person falls into this cate-
gory, a physician has the power to question the patient's competency
and thereby take away an individual's right to refuse treatment. In
fact, in certain circumstances courts and states have dictated that as
many as two non-attending physicians must confirm that a patient
is competent and fully informed before s/he can make a decision to
forego life support. 8 These requirements may possibly enable a sec-
ond, non-attending physician to disagree with the attending physi-
cian's finding of competency and thereby generate further conflict.
New York's statute, however, acts to protect the patient's decision by
requiring a second physician's opinion only where the attending
physician determines that the patient lacks capacity.' 9
16. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, § 35/2(d) (Smith-Hurd 1992); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1337.13(E) (Anderson Supp. 1991).
17. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.101(11),(17) (West Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.58.2 (West 1992).
18. In re Farrell, 529 A-2d 404, 414 (N.J. 1987) (The court held that when dealing
with an alleged competent patient living at home, in a hospital, or in a nursing home, two
non-attending physicians must examine the patient to confirm that s/he is competent and
fully informed about his or her prognosis, the medical alternatives available, risks in-
volved, and likely outcome if medical treatment is disconnected).
19. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §2983 (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1993) (for a decision to
withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment, the attending physician who makes the
determination that a principal lacks capacity to make health care decisions must consult
1994] 627
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In Ross v. Hilltop Rehabilitation Hospital,20 a physician ques-
tioned the competency of a conscious but paralyzed patient who re-
quested that his gastronomy tube be disconnected. When his request
was not honored, the patient's estate brought an action against the
hospital and treating physician, claiming violations of the patient's
civil rights as well as the Rehabilitation Act. The District Court dis-
posed of the claims by granting the defendants' motions for sum-
mary judgment due to the estate's failure to prove discrimination
based on the patient's handicapped state and the estate's failure to
establish the "state action" necessary to a state federal civil rights
claim (the hospital and physician were private, therefore the federal
Act did not protect the patient).2 ' The court also ruled that even if
the Rehabilitation Act (protecting the handicapped from discrimi-
nation by the state) did apply, the fact that the physician questioned
the patient's mental capacity to refuse care negated the claim.22
This case illustrates how even a conscious patient can be de-
nied the right to refuse treatment due to inadequacy of the law and
a physician's ability to question competency, which may be biased.
The patient, Mr. Rodas, was a thirty-four year old man who was
paralyzed from the neck down and was unable to speak or swallow,
but could communicate clearly through eye and head movement.
Full sentences were communicated by the patient looking at letters
of the alphabet. 3 The physician involved, Dr. Cobb, initially as-
sumed Mr. Rodas was competent. This assumption changed for no
other reason than that the patient, after several months in the fa-
cility, "consistently and continually requested that his feeding and
hydration be discontinued. " ' The state court found that Mr. Rodas
was competent based upon the testimony of psychologists and medi-
cal doctors that he "did not show signs of acute depression or de-
pression that rose to the level of a mental disorder or mental ill-
ness."' However, the District Court refused to grant summary
judgment on appeal because, among other issues of fact still unre-
solved, it felt that "Dr. Cobb had legitimate concerns about whether
Mr. Rodas was mentally competent."6 The court found the physician's
concerns legitimate because Mr. Rodas had attempted suicide prior to
his paralysis and was having marital and other stressful problems.
with another physician to confirm such determination).
20. 676 F. Supp. 1528, 1528 (D. Colo. 1987).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1530.
24. Id. at 1532.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1533.
27. Id.
[Vol. 42628
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The physician in Ross was also admittedly prompted to disre-
gard the patient's wishes because he had seen "other severely dis-
abled patients... [express] similar feelings as to the termination of
treatment, but all had eventually changed their minds and had
come to terms with their situations."" It is unclear whether the
physician in Ross was justified in disregarding the patient's wishes.
However, it is not difficult to imagine a situation where Dr. Cobb
might disregard a request for termination of treatment by a patient
who was unquestionably competent, based solely on his experiences
with other patients who had changed their minds. This type of phy-
sician behavior is clearly inconsistent with case law and statutes
giving competent patients the right to refuse treatment regardless of
the physician's view of their reasons. Unfortunately, it appears that
physicians are frequently in a position of possible conflict with pa-
tient wishes, family wishes, and law.
H. PHYSICIAN/HEALTH CARE WORKER CONFLICT
Two-thirds of the country's physicians say they have been involved in de-
cisions like the Cruzans'. In thousands of cases, the parents' wishes were
respected. But if a doctor (or hospital administration) disagrees, he or she
has the power to make a court case of it. The motives for this are never
simple and can vary widely, from the conviction that withdrawal [of life
support] is wrong all the way to fear of lawsuits, fear of death, or an awe
of technology.
29
Although a patient can express his or her wishes regarding life sup-
port in various ways, once a patient becomes incompetent it is the
physician who must consider all relevant factors and physically dis-
connect life support. It is the physician's medical determinations
and opinions which are relied on by courts, especially when the pa-
tient's wishes are not clear.30
Physicians understandably are apt to hesitate before taking an
action which will probably result in the death of a patient. Besides
the fear of criminal or civil liability (which most statutes make un-
warranted by exempting doctors from any liability for withdrawing
life support pursuant to patient or family wishes),3' many physicians
28. Id.
29. HILTON, supra note 2, at 95.
30. Guardianship of Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263, 1269 (Mass. 1992).
31. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3205 (1986 & Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.58.8 (West 1992); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2984 (McKinney 1990 & Sup-
p.1993). Illinois' new act immunizes health care professionals against liability incurred by
carrying out a surrogate's directions. After the passage of the law, there were reports of a
number of families and physicians acting under the new procedure. Jerry A. Menikoff et
al., Beyond Advance Directives - Health Care Surrogate Laws, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1165, 1168 (1992) (discussing Illinois Health Care Surrogate Act of 1991).
1994] 629
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feel that withdrawal of life support poses a moral dilemma, and conse-
quently overrule even clear wishes on the part of a patient and/or the
patienfts family.32 Even hospital staff members and non-attending phy-
sicians have the ability to prevent withdrawal of life support agreed
upon by family treating physicians, and/or an ethics committee.33
Physicians have always been taught that their job is to heal
and maintain life, and disconnecting life support strikes many as
not only being morally wrong, but evidence of their own professional
failure. 4 In response to this professional dilemma, the American
Medical Association, through its Council on Ethical and Judicial Af-
fairs, issued the following statement dated March 15, 1986:
Withholding or Withdrawing Life Prolonging Medical Treatment
The social commitment of the physician is to sustain life and relieve suf-
fering. Where the performance of one duty conflicts with the other, the
choice of the patient, or his family or legal representative if the patient is
incompetent to act in his own behalf, should prevail. In the absence of the
patient's choice or an authorized proxy, the physician must act in the best
interest of the patient.
For humane reasons, with informed consent, a physician may do what is
medically necessary to alleviate severe pain, or cease or omit treatment to
permit a terminally ill patient whose death is imminent to die. However,
he should not intentionally cause death.35
Although this statement still leaves much unclear and to the discre-
tion of the physician,36 at the very least it protects the ethical in-
tegrity of the medical profession in withdrawing life support. 1
32. For example, a two-year study of nursing home patients with living wills found
physicians overrode them in about 25% of cases. Brian McCormick, Flaws Surfacing in
Use of Advance Directives, 35 AMi. MED. NEws, Aug. 24, 1992, at 32.
33. Rosebush v. Oakland County Prosecutor, 491 N.W.2d 633 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
After consultation with treating physicians, the Neurorehabilitation Center staff, and
family's priest and attorney, and authorization by the hospital's bio-ethics committee, a
transfer to the hospital in order to withdraw life support was blocked by staff members of
the Neurorehabilitation Center. The staff members simply contacted the Oakland County
Prosecutor, who obtained an ex parte temporary restraining order, and later a prelimi-
nary injunction, prohibiting Joelle's transfer or her removal from life support. Id.
34. HILTON, supra note 2, at 98-104.
35. Robert L. Risley, Voluntary Active Euthanasia: The Next Frontier: Impact on the
Indigent, 3 ISSUEs IN LAw & MEDICINE, Dec. 22, 1992 at 61.
36. This statement still leaves a question in the minds of physicians as to first what
"imminent" means, and second, what the position of the AMA is regarding patients in a
persistent vegetative state.
37. Physicians and hospitals have tried to argue that withdrawal of life support is
contrary to the ethical integrity of the medical profession and therefore, should be
weighed in the state's decision to allow patients to refuse treatment. Rasmussen v. Flem-
ing, 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987) (holding that even if conflict had existed between patient in
chronic vegetative state and medical profession, "do not resuscitate" or "do not hospital-
630 [Vol. 42
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Physicians and hospitals may still refuse to withdraw life sup-
port even after a court has ordered compliance with patient and/or
family allowing physicians and hospitals that disagree on moral
grounds with the ordered withdrawal of life support to inform the
family and then transfer the patient either to another hospital or
physician.3 This issue was addressed in Brophy v. New England Si-
nai Hospital, Inc. 9 where the Massachusetts Supreme Court held
that a hospital need not remove a feeding tube if it found it to be
contrary to the ethical dictates of the medical profession, but that
the "guardian [was authorized] to remove [the ward] from the hospi-
tal to the care of other physicians who [would] honor [patient's]
wishes."4"
However, allowing a hospital or other health care facility to re-
fuse to honor a patient's wish presents two important problems: 1)
transfer of a patient in a PVS or other condition requiring life sup-
port is not only difficult but inconvenient and uncomfortable for the
patient and family; 2) most of the statutes do not address what
should be done if another facility is not willing to accept the patient.
New York is the only state which statutorily responds to this di-
lemma. The New York statute states that transfer is allowed under
reasonable circumstances (transfer must be prompt and the facility
must be reasonably accessible), but ends by stating that "if such a
transfer [cannot be] effected, the hospital shall seek judicial relief or
honor the agent's decision."41 Thus, hospitals in New York can still,
ize" orders placed on patient's chart would not have brought into disrepute ethical integ-
rity of medical profession, and thus, would not have implicated the state's interest in pre-
serving ethical integrity of the profession as a factor to be balanced against patient's right
to refuse medical treatment).
38. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3205(c) (1986 & Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN
§ 40:1299.58.7 (West 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-11:6 (1991); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 2984 (McKinney 1990 & Supp.1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 34-12D-11, 34-
12D-12 (1991 & Supp. 1992).
39. 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986).
40. Id. at 629. The wife of the patient (the patient being in a PVS), brought suit
when physicians and hospital refused to discontinue artificial nutrition and hydration.
The Norfolk Division of the Probate and Family Court ordered continuation of nutrition
and hydration and enjoined the removal of the tube providing nutrition and hydration.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts transferred the case from the Appeals
Court on its own initiative. Id. at 628 n.5.
41. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2984 (McKinney 1990 & Supp.1993). A private hospital
is not required to honor an agent's health care decision that the hospital would not honor
if the decision had been made by the principal because the decision is contrary to a
formally adopted policy of the hospital that is expressly based on religious beliefs or
sincerely held moral convictions central to the facility's operating principles and has
informed the patient or agent and the patient is transferred promptly to another hospital
that is reasonably accessible under the circumstances and is willing to honor the agent's




with court approval, refuse to comply with a patient's wishes even if
the patient has no alternative.
In Gray v. Romeo42 the Court went a step further than the
statutes permitting transfer in stating: "if Marcia Gray cannot be
promptly transferred to a health care facility that will respect her
wishes, the Rhode Island Medical Center must accede to her re-
quests."43 The Gray court partially relied on the New Jersey case of
In re Jobes" which held that the nursing home involved could not re-
fuse to participate in the withdrawal of the feeding tube by keeping
it connected until the patient was transferred.45 The Jobes court
based its decision on the fact that the nursing home had not in-
formed the family of its policy upon admission,5 that it would be
extremely difficult or impossible to find another facility to accept the
patient and, to allow the nursing home to refuse cooperation "would
essentially frustrate Mrs. Jobes' right of self-determination."47 The
Gray court based its decision on the Rhode Island statute guarantee-
ing a patient the right to refuse medical care.48 The statutory guar-
antee, when combined with the Gray family's reliance on the hospi-
tal's "willingness to defer to their choice among courses of medical
treatment,"49 seems a sound basis for requiring personnel to with-
draw the life support. After all, the health care workers are not be-
ing asked to affirmatively kill someone, but merely to disconnect
tubes that they connected, consistent with Marcia Gray's right to re-
fuse treatment. Unfortunately, the Gray decision is not likely to be
repeated, since at the time there was no applicable countervailing
statute allowing hospital personnel to refuse to take part in the
withdrawal of life support, 0 as are now common.
42. 697 F. Supp. 580, 589-90 (D.R.I. 1988).
43. Id. at 591.
Recognition of Marcia Gray's right to terminate nutrition and hydration obvi-
ously places a great burden on health care professionals who rank giving food
and water to the sick as one of their highest duties... Yet, even though Marcia
Gray has decided to forego the use of the G-tube [Gastric feeding tube], she still
needs medical attention. As unsettling as it must be to them, health care pro-
fessionals must acknowledge Marcia Gray's right of self-determination.
Id.
44. 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987).
45. Id. at 450.
46. Consequently, many nursing homes have made it their regular practice to spell
out their policies to incoming patients. See, e.g., policies of The Park Associates, Inc., on
file with the Buffalo Law Review.
47. Id.
48. 697 F. Supp. at 589.
49. Id. at 590 (citingln re Requena, 517 A.2d 869 (N.J. App. Div. 1986)).
50. Actually, the hospital employees tried to invoke a statute stating that a health
care worker may refuse on moral or religious grounds to participate in an abortion or
sterilization procedure, but the court held that is was clearly limited to abortion and
[Vol. 42632
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As stated previously, courts, when concerned with resolving a
conflict in the matter of withdrawal of life support, frequently rely
on the opinions of physicians and hospital ethics committees in
reaching their conclusions.5' While some physicians may disagree
among themselves whether it is appropriate to withdraw life sup-
port,5 2 hospitals and physicians sometimes take no stand on the is-
sue and are willing to be guided by the family, guardian, and/or
courts. 3 The courts themselves have stated that life support issues
are best left to patients, their families, and physicians, and that
courts should become involved only in the event of conflict.54
sterilization and did not apply to withdrawal of life support. 796 F. Supp. at 590.
51. Guardianship of Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263, 1269 (Mass. 1992). "In reaching his deci-
sion, the judge relied on two neurological consultations, three reports of the Guardian ad
litem, and a review of the case by a Wrentham Hospital ethics committee. None of these
evaluations contested the recommendation that nasoduodenal feeding and hydration be
discontinued." Id. See also, In re Guardianship of L.W. v. LE Phillips Career Development
Center, 482 N.W.2d 60, 71-72 (Wis. 1992) stating-
a guardian may consent to the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining
medical treatment on behalf of a once competent person whose conduct never
was of a kind from which one could draw a reasonable inference upon which to
make a substituted judgment, when: 1) the incompetent patient's attending
physician, together with two independent neurologists or physicians, determine
with reasonable medical certainty that the patient is in a persistent vegetative
state and has no reasonable chance of recovery to a cognitive and sentient life;
and 2) the guardian determines in good faith that the withholding of treatment
is in the ward's best interests....
Id. at 84-85.
52. See Rosebush v. Oakland County Prosecutor, 491 N.W.2d 633 (Mich. Ct. App.
1992); Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 583; Affidavit of Defendant's In House Counsel at 2-3, Drag-
onette v. Children's Hospital of Buffalo, Inc., (No. 8770/92) (out of court settlement)
(physician not in attendance is against withdrawal of life support and will testify in
court).
53. Couture v. Couture, 549 N.E.2d 571, 574 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (hospital is willing
and desires to be guided by the wishes of Daniel's family and guardian) superseded by
Statute as stated in In re Guardianship of Crum, 580 N.E.2d 876 (Ohio P. Ct. 1991); see
e.g., Defendant's Affidavit, Dragonette (No. 8770/92)(there being no hospital policy govern-
ing what should be done in case of minor in PVS whose parents wish to remove artificial
nutrition and hydration, in-house counsel informed hospital ethics committee that no ac-
tion could be taken absent an order from the court).
54. Rosebush v. Oakland County Prosecutor, 491 N.W.2d at 638 (concluding that the
decision whether to end the dying process is a personal decision for family members or
those who bear a legal responsibility for the patient); Guardianship of Barry, 445 So.2d
365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (rejecting state's request that judicial review be required be-
fore life support may be withheld from a non-brain-dead minor where decision by parents
is supported by at least two physicians); In re Moorhouse, 593 A.2d 1256, 1262 (N.J. Su-
per. Ct. 1991) (holding that if any one of the involved parties, including the Public Advo-
cate, disagrees with the decision to terminate life support, the decision cannot be imple-
mented without a court order); In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 415 (N.J. 1987) (noting that
judicial review of a competent patienfs refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment is
generally inappropriate and is useful only in unusual circumstances, such as a conflict
among the physicians, family members, or other health-care professionals).
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"Although prior judicial approval is not required, the courts remain
available in the event of disagreement between the parties, any case
of suspected abuse, or other appropriate instances."55 Unfortunately,
it will become clear in the next sections that even if physicians agree
and comply with the wishes of the patient and/or family, conflicts
frequently arise among the latter.
III. PATIENT WISHES:
CONFLICT AMONG ADVANCE DIRECTIVES,
DESIGNATED AGENTS, AND STATUTES
There are currently several legally recognized written means of
making one's wishes known regarding the withdrawal of life sup-
port. While many different names are used for these instruments,
there are basically two categories: living wills and health care prox-
ies. Both are accurately described as "Advance Directives" but the
term is commonly used to refer only to the former.
A. Living Wills
[T]he knowledge that advance instructions will be honored may be a
source of relief and reassurance. Limited studies tend to confirm both that
loss of control over events prompts patients to suffer negative physical and
emotional effects and that discussion of advance directives causes patients
to worry less.56
Living wills are health care instruments that are used to indi-
cate one's specific wishes regarding health care in the event of in-
competency. The primary purpose of a living will is to instruct phy-
sicians as to when they should discontinue life support and can
specify certain circumstances for withdrawal of its different forms.
At least partly in response to the controversial and highly visual
litigation in the past ten years,5 7 every state in our nation has en-
acted some form of advance directive legislation. 8 Many of the new
55. Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d at 638 (quoting In re LHR, 321 S.E.2d 716, 722-23 (Ga.
1984)).
56. Norman L. Cantor, Prospective Autonomy: On the Limits of Shaping One's Post.
competence Medical Fate, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoLY 13, 21 (1992).
57. See generally Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990);
In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976); see also, Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 583 (describing
how the Quinlan case caused a discussion between Marcia Gray and her husband regard-
ing her wishes on the topic of life support, which was later used as clear and convincing
evidence that Marcia Gray would wish her nutrition and hydration to be withdrawn),
58. Suzan Onel & Sigrid Fry-Revere, Legal Trends in Bioethics, 3 J. CLINICAL
ETHIcs 83-84, 151-152, 242 (1992); ALA. CODE §§ 22-8a-1 to -10 (1990); ALASKA
STAT.§§ 18.12.010 to .100 (1991); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to -3210 (1993); ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 20-17-201 to -218 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1993); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (West 1989
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statutes recognize living wills and give examples of acceptable for-
mats. 9 These statutes do, however, differ in several respects:
In some states living wills may be executed by any person, at any time
(and in some states they may be executed on behalf of minors), while in
other states they require a waiting period, and may not be executed dur-
ing a terminal illness. In most states they are of indefinite duration, al-
though in some states they expire after a determined number of years.
Some statutes address only the terminally ill, others include those in irre-
versible coma, and still others provide for different conditions to trigger
the substantive provisions of the document. Some states require the for-
& Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 19a-570 to -575 (Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§§ 2501-2509 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -2430 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 765.101 to .401 (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -12 (1993); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 327D-1 to -27 (1993); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4502 to -4509 (1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
755 act 40 § 35 (Smith-Hurd 1992); IND. CODE. ANN. §§ 16-364-1 to -21 (West 1992 &
Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.1 to .11 (West 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28,101
to -28,109 (1992); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.622-.644 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1 to .10 (West Supp. 1992 & Supp. 1993); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18A, §§ 5-701 to -714 (West Supp. 1993); MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-601
to -614 (Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. L. 201D § 5 (Supp. 1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 700.496 (West Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145B.01 to .17 (West Supp. 1993);
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121 (1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.010 to .055 (Vernon
1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-102 to -111, -201 to -206 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-
401 to -416, (1992); NEB. REV. STAT. §§30-3401 to 3432 (1992); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.540
to .690 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:1 to -H:16 (1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:24-
53 to 24-78 (West Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-1 to -10 (Michie 1983); N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 2984- 2994 (McKinney 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 90-320 to -323
(1993); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-06.4-01 to -14, 23-06.5-01 to -18 (1991 & Supp. 1993); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.11-1337.17(Anderson Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§§ 3101.1-3101.16 (West Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.505 to .585, .605 to .650
(1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-4.10-1 to -4.10-12 (1989 & Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 44-77-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op 1985 & Supp 1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs ANN. §§ 34-12D-
2 (1986 & Supp. 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to -110 (Supp. 1993); TEX. CIV.
PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 135.001 (West Supp 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to
-1118 (1993 & Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262 (1987); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 54.1-2981 to -2992 (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010
to .905 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -3 (1991 & Supp. 1993); WIS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01 to .15 (West 1991); WYO. STAT. §§ 35-22-101 to -108 (1988 & Supp.
1993).
59. ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.040 (1991 & Supp. 1992); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3262
(1993); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, § 7186.5 (West Supp.1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 19a-570(7), 19a-575 (West 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN §§ 765.302 (West Supp. 1993); HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 327D-1 to -5 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 39-4504 (1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755,
act. 40, § 45/4-1 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144B (West Supp. 1993); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN § 1299.58.3 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 5-
701(b)(4), 5-702(a),(b) (West Supp. 1992); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-602, 5-603
(1990 & Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.03 and .04 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.610 (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 §§ 3080.4, 3101.2, 3101.4
(West 1994); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.510 - 127.585 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-30, 44-
77-40, 44-77-50 (Law. Co-op. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-12D-2 to -3 (1986 &
Supp. 1993); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 154 to 155.20 (West 1993 and Supp. 1993).
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malities of a will for the living will to be recognized by statute, while other
states require different formalities.
60
Consequently, individuals are forced to carefully examine the some-
times complicated legal requirements in their respective states. The
complexity of the advance directive statutes may be part of the rea-
son why most Americans still have not taken advantage of their new
ability to execute health care directives.6'
Differences between state statutes may pose a problem in the
event a resident of one state drafts a living will and subsequently
moves to another state. Currently, some statutes do provide that
living wills drafted elsewhere may be valid in the current state of
residency, 6 but others expressly void declarations which do not con-
form with specific requirements.'
One problem with advance directives is that they cannot fore-
see the future. For example, future advances in medicine may be
unintentionally precluded by an old advance directive.64 Another
conflict may arise if a declaration directs certain treatments or
withdrawal of treatments if the now incompetent author is found to
be pregnant. Several statutes deem some or all advance directives
void in the event an incompetent patient is pregnant.65 According to
60. BARRY R. FURROW FT AL., HEALTH LAw 1112-13 (2d ed. 1991).
61. McCormick, supra note 32, at 32; Yuen, supra note 1, at 592.
62. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.112 (West Supp. 1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, act. 40,
§ 45/4-1 (Smith-Hurd 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 40:1299.58.10 (West 1992) (stating
that a declaration-properly executed in and under the laws of another state is deemed to
be validly executed for purposes of this Part); MD CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-617 (1990
& Supp. 1993); N.H. STAT. ANN. §137-H-14(a) (1992); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-11 (Supp.
1993) (stating that a living will executed in another state is valid in West Virginia as long
as it is executed in compliance with either West Virginia law or the law of the state where
the document is executed).
63. HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 327D-4,4.5 (1985 & Supp. 1992) (recognizing declarations,
but only if it includes the checklist in §327D-4, specifying whether the declarant wishes
the continuation of artificial feeding (if executed subsequent to July 1, 1991)); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 145B.03 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994); WYO. STAT. § 35-22-102(e) (1988 & Sup-
p. 1993)(stating that all living will declarations must contain a warning to the declarant
that living wills have significant medical, legal, and ethical implications).
64. According to McCormick:
the patient's expressed wishes at the time a directive is executed may not be the
same months or years later when treatment is needed, Dr. Lo said. The pa-
tient's values or priorities may have changed, or new treatments may come into
play that were unavailable when a living will was written.
McCormick, supra note 32, at 32.
65. "The declaration of a qualified patient known to the attending physician to be
pregnant is given no effect as long as it is probable that the fetus could develop to the
point of live birth with continued application of life-sustaining procedures." ALASKA STAT.
§ 18.12.040(c) (1991); see also, FLA. STAT. ANN §765.113(2) (West 1986 & Supp. 1993);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 327D-6 (1993); MICH. COMiP. LAWs ANN. §700.496(9)(d) (West Supp.
1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1337.17 (Anderson 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-
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the Attorney General of Alaska, voiding the advance directives of a
pregnant, incompetent woman is problematic under the U.S. Consti-
tution.66 Since it is settled that a woman has a constitutional right to
make a determination regarding her pregnancy during the first two
trimesters, i.e. abortion," it follows that statutes denying the valid-
ity of her advance directive may be in direct conflict with this right.68
Why do many statutes presume that a woman would wish to be kept
alive artificially, with no hope of recovery, in order to bring a fetus to
term? Even the Catholic Church recently expressed distaste for
keeping a pregnant woman alive for the gestation period of a fetus
only 13 weeks old.69 Wisconsin's statute is the only one specifically
stating that a health care agent does have the capacity to make de-
cisions on behalf of a pregnant woman. °
One more major conflict with statutes limiting the use of ad-
vance directives may occur when an individual directs that if s/he
becomes terminally ill, or is in a PVS, artificial nutrition and hy-
dration shall be discontinued. Several statutes limit the power of
12D-10 (Supp. 1993).
66. "Subsection (c) is constitutionally problematic ... [it], in essence, would take this
constitutionally recognized right from a woman who has expressed her wishes, and per-
haps even alter the form declaration to state her specific wishes, regarding life-sustaining
measures during her first two trimesters of pregnancy." ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.040(c) an-
not. (1991) (opinion of attorney general).
67. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
68. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.040(c) annot. (1991) (opinion of attorney general). For
a comprehensive discussion arguing that pregnancy provisions in statutes recognizing
living wills are unconstitutional, see Hope E. Matchan & Kathryn E. Sheffield, Adding
Constitutional Depravation to Untimely Death: South Dakota's Living Will Pregnancy
Provision, 37 S.D. L. REV. 388 (1992).
69. "In any right-to-life - or - death - debate, the Roman Catholic church is vocifer-
ous, particularly in Bavaria. Traditionally a fervent protector of the unborn child, the
Church in Germany has come out against preserving this particular life." Liz Hunt,
Marion The Human Incubator Splits the Conscience of a Nation, THE INDEPENDENT, Nov.
1, 1992, at 3, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INDPNT File.
Women's rights groups say that the decision to sustain the pregnancy has reduced
women to mere "baby machines," and that Marion's right to a dignified and peaceful
death has been denied. Opinion polls show that more than 80 per cent of Germans think
that Marion should be taken off life support. Id. Marion's parents wished to maintain the
life support and will take care of the baby. However, the final decision to start life support
was the physician's. This decision has been criticized as "experimental" and opponents
wonder what effects this strange pregnancy will have on the fetus. Id.
70. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 155.20 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993).
In the absence of a specific directive by the principal or if the principal's desires
are unknown, the health care agent shall, in good faith, act in the best interests
of the principal in exercising his or her authority. If the principal is known to be
pregnant, the health care agent may make a health care decision on behalf of the
principal that the power of attorney for health care instrument authorizes.
Id. § 155.20(5),(6) (emphasis added).
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advance directives by prohibiting the removal of any form of life
support unless the patient is terminally ill." Fortunately, some
states which had previously denied individuals the ability to direct
in advance withdrawal of nutrition and hydration either when ter-
minally ill or in a PVS, have recently amended their statutes to al-
low one or both. However, many states still place restrictions and
limitations on the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration that they
do not place on other forms of life support.73
Many states place this added emphasis on nutrition and hy-
dration in spite of the fact that there is a great deal of authority
stating that it should not be distinguished from other forms of life
support. 4 In Guardianship of L.W.,71 the Supreme Court of Wiscon-
71. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.101(11) (West Supp. 1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, act
40, § 35/2(d) (Smith-Hurd 1992); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.13(B) (Anderson 1993);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3080.4 (West Supp. 1994); WIS. STAT ANN. §154.01 (1991).
72. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to -3204 (1993); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 19a-570(1) (West 1990 & Supp. 1992) (changing definition of life support in 1991 to
include nutrition and hydration); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.101 (West Supp. 1993) (changed
in 1990, then again in 1992: nutrition and hydration are no longer distinguished from
other "life-prolonging procedures"); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.2, 144B.6 (West Supp.
1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.2 (West 1992) (changing definition of "terminal
and irreversible condition" to include those in a continual profound comatose state with
no reasonable chance of recovery); MASS. GEN. L. 201D § 5 (Supp. 1993); N.Y. PuB.
HEALTH LAW § 2984 (McKinney 1993) (newly recognizing health care agents and allowing
agent to request the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration, but only where pa-
tient's wishes are specifically known); N.C. GEN. STAT. §90-322(a) (1990 & Supp. 1992);
OR. REV. STAT. § 127.505(9) (1989 & Supp. 1991) (removing the "terminally ill" require-
ment for withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures).
73. IDAHO CODE § 39-4504 (1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 702(d) (Smith-
Hurd 1991-1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §311.622-.644 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.03 (West Supp. 1993); MO. ANN. STAT. §404.820 (Vernon Supp.
1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-202 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.624 (1991); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 137-H:6 III (Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. §90-321(b) (1990 & Supp. 1991);
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2982(2) (McKinney 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-02(4)
(1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.13(c) (Anderson 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63
§3080.4 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.505(4) (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 23-4.11-3 (1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-40 (Law. Co-op. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 34-12D-2 (Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.01 (West 1991).
74. See AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Code of Medical Ethics, Op.
2.18 (1986). "Courts generally consider artificial hydration and nutrition.., medical
treatment." Guardianship of Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263, 1267 n.11 (Mass. 1992) (citing Brophy
v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986)); see Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (although the Supreme Court Justices
wrote a number of opinions, eight of nine Justices agree that withdrawal of feeding and
hydration is medical treatment); Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 587 (D.R.I. 1988); In re
Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 296 (Ill. 1989); Matter of Sue Anne Lawrance, 579
N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1991); In Matter of Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1236 (N.J. 1985); In re Grant,
747 P.2d 445 (Wash. 1987).
75. 482 N.W.2d 60 (Wis. 1992). "Nearly every state's final court to consider the issue
has concluded that artificial feeding is medical treatment which may be refused. We
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sin relied on the New Jersey Supreme Court's statement on artificial
feeding:
Once one enters the realm of complex, high-technology medical care, it is
hard to shed the "emotional symbolism" of food. However, artificial feed-
ings such as nasogastric tubes ... are significantly different from bottle-
feeding or spoon feeding-they are medical procedures with inherent risks
and possible side effects, instituted by skilled health-care providers to
compensate for impaired physical functioning. Analytically, artificial
feeding.. .can be seen as equivalent to artificial breathing by means of a
respirator. Both prolong life through mechanical means when the body is
no longer able to perform a vital bodily function on its own.
76
The most frequently cited authority on this issue is Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion in Cruzan where she states that arti-
ficial nutrition and hydration are forms of life support and should
not be distinguished therefrom.77 Consequently, it is possible that a
state statute prohibiting withdrawal of nutrition and hydration as
opposed to other life support might be challenged as unconstitu-
tional under the Due Process Clause.s Although the nutrition and
reach the same conclusion." Id. at 63.
76. Id. at 66 (quoting In re Conroy, 486 A-2d at 1236 (citations omitted)).
77. 497 U.S. at 287-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor noted that arti-
ficial feeding should not be distinguished from other forms of medical treatment because
regardless of whether the court deems the method used to pass food and water into the
body medical treatment, it involves some degree of intrusion and restraint.
Feeding a patient by means of a nasogastric tube requires a physician to pass a
long flexible tube through the patient's nose, throat, and esophagus and into the
stomach. Because of the discomfort such a tube causes, "[iany patients need to
be restrained forcibly and their hands put into large mittens to prevent them
from removing the tube."... A gastrostomy tube (as was used to provide food
and water to Nancy Cruzan), or jejunostomy tube must be surgically implanted
into the stomach or small intestine.
Id. at 288-289 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs, Code of Medical Ethics, Op. 2.20 (1989) on the issue of withholding or
withdrawing life-prolonging medical treatment); see also THE HASTINGS CENTER,
GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT AND THE CARE'OF THE
DYING 59 (1987) (providing that consensus of medical community does not support
maintaining distinction).
78. Justice O'Connor stated:
Requiring a competent adult to endure such procedures [insertion of nutrition
and hydration mechanisms] against her will burdens the patient's liberty, dig-
nity, and freedom to determine the course of her own treatment. Accordingly,
the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must protect, if it protects
anything, an individual's deeply personal decision to reject medical treatment,
including the artificial delivery of food and water.
497 U.S. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring); The Supreme Court in Cruzan indicated in
dicta that the constitutional right to refuse medical treatment encompasses the right to
refuse artificial nutrition and hydration. Jill Hollander, Health Care Proxies: New York's
Attempt to Resolve the Right to Die Dilemma, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 145, 168 (1991) (citing
Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 288 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
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hydration issue was not before the Supreme Court in Cruzan, the
Supreme Court's remarks may at least deter the passage of further
legislation maintaining such a distinction. 9
Several other possible conflicts may occur in the use of living
wills, one being a conflict with one's self: "[iut is easy to envision in-
stances of extreme dissonance between the perceptible interests of a
now incompetent patient and the advance directive purporting to
govern medical intervention for that patient."0 For example, a per-
son who is a "vitalist," one who believes in preserving life at any
cost) and specifies that s/he does not wish life support to be with-
drawn for any reason, might later experience a great deal of unfore-
seen pain, which, if s/he was able, might cause the patient to retract
an advance directive."' Additionally, some individuals might word
their advance directives in such a way that precludes a treatment or
withdrawal of treatment not envisioned at that time.8" Therefore,
statutes should require individuals to address the possibility of the
development of new treatments. Lastly, a living will may conflict
with a health care proxy, also executed by the individual, either by
both documents specifically stating conflicting directions, or by giv-
ing the health care proxy the ability to make a decision when the
living will has already dictated a clear action or non-action. Conse-
quently, statutes dealing with life support issues should require or
at least suggest clauses in any advance directive specifying which
document will take precedent, or, as many statutes now do, state
that the health care proxy must act consistently with the living will.83
B. Health Care Proxies
Besides the term "proxy," two other terms have been used to
designate a surrogate decision maker for the event of incompetence:
"durable power of attorney," and health care "agent." All of these
documents are prepared in the anticipation of incompetency and the
wish to designate someone whom the individual trusts to make
health care decisions on his or her behalf. As the states began to
recognize living wills, many statutes have also recognized health
care proxies and provided examples of desirable forms for this pur-
pose.M Two problems may occur with the use of proxies: 1) the sur-
79. John Nicholas Suhr, Jr., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health: A
Clear and Convincing Call for Comprehensive Legislation to Protect Incompetent Patients'
Rights, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 1477, 1512-13 and n.195 (1991).
80. Cantor, supra note 56, at 13.
81. Id. at 14.
82. Id. at 13-22; see also McCormick, supra note 32, at 32.
83. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
84. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-54a (West Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. §765.203
(West Supp. 1993); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 755, para. 40/5 et seq. (1993); IND. CODE ANN. §16-
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rogate may allow his or her own feelings determine what to do
rather than what the patient would have wanted (the surrogate may
even act contrary to a living will); and 2) the surrogate may be sub-
ject to contrary restrictions by statutes.
Along with the growing enthusiasm for proxy decision making,
ethical and empirical doubts have arisen about "whether proxies can
select interventions that the patient would have selected." 5 Proxies
are obviously prone to their own "biases, prejudices, and psychologi-
cal agendas." 6 Some statutes even enable a surrogate decision-
maker to override a patient's directives."' Connecticut and Hawaii,
however, specifically forbid agents from voiding a declaration of a
patient's wishes, and Arizona's, Oregon's, Florida's and Wisconsin's
statutes require that the agent act in good faith consistent with any
valid declaration executed by the patient.""
While a health care proxy instrument leaves much to the dis-
cretion of someone other than the patient, it can be argued that
proxy decision making may be more accurate than a sometimes-
limiting living will. 9
Formal advance care documents completed months or even years before
often utilize "general and imprecise" terms as well as vague hypothetical
situations that may be only marginally related to the actual clinical cir-
cumstances. Proxies, on the other hand, make "real time" decisions. They
have knowledge of the patient's specific situation and prognosis; they also
have the opportunity for detailed discussions of the various treatment op-
tions with the physician and other health care staff.90
As stated above, even if the proxy is able to make a decision
which the patient would have made if competent, some statutes
limit a proxy in what s/he can or cannot decide. 91 For instance, in In
36-4-1 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144B (West Supp. 1993); MICH.
COMtP. LAWS ANN. §700.496 (West Supp. 1993); MO. ANN. STAT. §404.820 (Vernon Supp.
1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1 to -H:6 (1993); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2984
(McKinney 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. §90-321(a)(2) (1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.13
(Anderson 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.530-.580 (1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1 to 2986
(Michie 1991 & Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 155.20 (West 1991).
85. Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, Proxy decision making for incompetent
patients: an ethical and empirical analysis, 267 JAMA 2067 (1992).
86. Id. at 2068.
87. See, e.g., Health Care Surrogate Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 755 para. 40, et. seq.
(Smith-Hurd 1993)
88. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3206 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.105, 765.205
(West Supp. 1993); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327D-4 (1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.535(4) (1991);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 155.20(5) (West 1991).
89. Emanuel, supra note 85, at 2068.
90. Id.
91. Erica F. Wood, Guardianship: Legislative Developments, 209 PRACTICING L.
INST. 275, 303 (1992) (citing FLA. STAT. ANN § 744.3725 (current version at § 765.05)
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re Guardianship of Browning,92 in spite of the fact that Mrs.
Browning had a living will directing that she not be kept alive by
artificial means, and had appointed a health care proxy who re-
quested that her feeding tube be removed, the trial, district, and
Florida Supreme Court refused to enforce the request based upon
Florida living will law.13 The Florida living will statute pertained
only to those whose death was imminent, and at the time specifically
excluded artificial sustenance from its definition of "life-prolonging
procedures;"94 because Mrs. Browning was not terminally ill, the
court was forced to base its authorization of the removal from life
support on her constitutional right to privacy.
In response to the Browning case, the Florida legislature
passed a bill allowing individuals, through a living will, to refuse
nutrition and hydration if they were not helping the patient get
better, but the Act was vetoed by the governor. In 1990, the legisla-
ture was able to amend its living will laws to allow terminally ill
patients to have artificial nutrition withdrawn, but a health care
agent still could not request their withdrawal if not specifically
authorized by the advance directive."5 However, 1992 amendments
loosened these requirements further with the addition of surrogacy
laws for those without formal proxies or advance directives." Addi-
tionally, even if a patient has specifically requested that artificial
nutrition be withdrawn under certain circumstances, the Florida
statute still gives the patient's next of kin the right to negate the
withdrawal for a reasonable length of time even though all of the
living will requirements have been met.98 Statutes such as Florida's
which contain language regarding the rights of family members hold
potential for additional conflicts.
(West 1986 & Supp. 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE §30.1-28-12(4) (1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
63, § 3080.4 (current version at tit. 30, § 3-119(3))(West 1992 & Supp. 1993)).
92. 568 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
93. Id.; see also HILTON, supra note 2, at 69.
94. Sarah J. Elliott, Life and Death After Cruzan: Recent Developments in Right to
Die Cases, 7 HEALTHSPAN 12, 13 (1992).
95. HILTON, supra note 2, at 68-70.
96. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.075 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992) (repealed 1992).
97. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.401 (however, Florida's new terminology is inconsistent
with that of other states: "surrogate" refers to a formal written appointment of a deci-
sionmaker by the patient, while "proxy" refers to a person making the decisions where
there is no document designating such).
98. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.105 (West 1993).
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IV. FAMILY CONFLICT
While statutes giving family members the ability to override a
patient's directives are rare, some statutes do give families decision-
making power in the event that there is no advance directive.99
Family members have traditionally been expected to make decisions
for incompetent patients by physicians and the courts.00 There is,
however, some doubt as to whether families can make the best deci-
sions for a relative when confronted with their personal feelings and
interests. Incompetent family members may be both emotional and
financial burdens and, therefore, "family, more than anyone else,
may have a serious conflict of interest."' However, many feel fami-
lies generally "are motivated by affection and concern for their loved
one, not a conflict of interest."
10 2
Making life or death decisions for someone is psychologically stressful.
Surveys show that people are more hesitant to terminate care for a rela-
tive than for themselves. Thus, even if a patient's preferences are known,
proxy decision makers may be hesitant to implement them, trying to avoid
the moral and psychological responsibility for terminating life-sustaining
treatments for a loved one.'
03
Lastly, even family members may not know what the patient would
have wanted. 104 However, if the law is tailored to allow family mem-
bers to make health care decisions without conclusive knowledge of
a patient's wishes, fewer court battles would arise while the pa-
tient's best interests may still be manifested:
Family members have a unique knowledge of the patient. [They] will
know [his or her] lifestyle, values, medical attitudes, and general world
view.... Even if no prior statements were made, in the context of the in-
dividual's entire prior mental life, including his or her philosophical, relig-
ious, and moral views, life goals, values about the purpose of life,.., and
attitudes toward sickness, medical procedures, suffering and death that the
individuals likely treatment/non-treatment preferences can be discovered.'0 5
99. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-571 (West Supp. 1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755,
§40/25 (Smith-Hurd 1992) (Health Care Surrogate Act); IND. CODE ANN. §16-36-1-5 (West
1992 & Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.7 (West 1991 & Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN § 40:1299.58.5 (West 1992); MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605 (1993).
100. Emanuel, supra note 85, at 2067; see, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.
1976); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987).
101. Emanuel, supra note 85, at 2068 (quoting ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W.
BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS (1989)).
102. Joseph Fins, When others must choose: Deciding for patients without capacity,





Conflict can also occur between family members. Parents,
spouses, adult children, and siblings can all have very different atti-
tudes and interests toward the withdrawal of life support of a family
member. Some statutes have attempted to deal with intra-family
conflicts by listing family members (sometimes with friends and
others) in order of their decision-making authority.' Illinois' statute
attempts to deal with this problem by further specifying that if there
is more than one person in a given category on the list, for example,
three siblings, these people are asked to reach a consensus. If they
fail to do so, they can make decisions by a majority vote.107 At first
glance, it may seem strange to statutorily rank those having deci-
sion-making authority and require them to "vote" on the life of a
relative. However, I have seen evidence even in my own family of
how certain family members may feel better able or more entitled to
make decisions than others. This type of exclusion or disagreement
can cause a great deal of division, resentment, and bitterness at a
time when families should be drawing together. If statutes such as
Illinois' dictates exactly who must make a decision, some intra-fa-
milial pressure may be relieved. The voting strategy may at least
force families to discuss the issues from more than one angle.
The Ohio case, Couture v. Couture,"" illustrates one type of in-
tra-family conflict which may arise. The case involved the divorced
parents of an incompetent adult child. Daniel Couture's mother was
appointed guardian by the probate court after a hearing. At the
guardianship hearing, she testified that it would be in Daniel's best
interest to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration. Her position
was formulated with the advice of Daniel's physician and the sup-
port of other family members.0 9 Consequently, Daniel's father ob-
jected and instituted legal proceedings in several forms to oppose
and prevent the proposed withdrawal, including a petition to remove
Ms. Couture as guardian."0 In spite of his father's protests, evidence
was introduced of Daniel's prior statements and wishes."' However,
for reasons unexplained, Ms. Coutere voluntarily withdrew as
guardian while the case was pending appeal and her ex-husband
106. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-570(1) (West 1990 & Supp. 1992) (spouse, adult
son or daughter, either parent, adult sibling, grandparent); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.401
(West Supp. 1993); IND. CODE ANN. §16-8-12-5 (Bums 1993) (for a minor: judicially ap-
pointed guardian, parent, adult sibling); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, act 40 § 25 (Smith-Hurd
1992); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(a) (Michie 1993).
107. Menikoff et al., supra note 31, at 1167 (discussing formerly ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
110 1/2, para. 804-1 et seq. (Smith-Hurd 1991 & Supp. 1992)).
108. 549 N.E.2d 571 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
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was appointed." 2 However, on appeal, the Ohio Ct. of Appeals held
that the power-of-attorney-statute precluded the guardian from re-
questing the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration."' This case
demonstrates some of the familial and legal entanglements which
can occur under present laws, even when all parties involved feel
that they have the patient's best interests at heart.
Lastly, in the event that the patient has provided no advance
directives, there is no guarantee that an elderly patient has a family
to make a decision for him or her. Many elderly patients either have
no known living relatives, or have no relative who wishes to make
health care decisions on the patient's behalf. To be truly effective
and comprehensive, our society should not promulgate laws which
are based on ideal family situations. Even if laws are enacted
granting families the authority to make health care decisions for an
incompetent, where does that leave the right to refuse treatment for
someone with no family? Who should make health care decisions for
these patients? Most statutes leave this question unanswered.
V. SOLUTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The new federal Patient Self-Determination Act,"4 which went
into effect December 1991, is a step, though small, toward resolving
some of the uncertainty in withdrawing life support. The Act re-
quires Medicare and Medicaid accepting hospitals, health mainte-
nance organizations, nursing homes, and home health agencies to
provide a patient, upon admission, with written information con-
cerning their right to execute advance directives under state law
and to record any advance directives the patient might have."5 The
theory behind the Patient Self-Determination Act appears to be that
if the public is educated as to its rights regarding the termination of
life support, more people will execute advance directives, and fewer
conflicts will result." 6 However, confronting people with life support
issues and advance directives upon admission to a hospital may not
be an optimal solution. Being admitted to a hospital for a health
problem usually produces great stress, and may prevent many pa-
tients from easily or rationally making decisions regarding their
possibly impending incompetency." 7 Additionally, under the Patient
112. Id. at 572-73.
113. Id.
114. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4206, 104
Stat. 1388-115 (codified at 42 U.S.CJ.A § 1395 cc. (West Supp. 1993)).
115. Charles P. Sabatino, Health Decisions Power of Attorney, CONSUMERS' RES.
MAG., Feb. 1992, at 32.
116. Yuen, supra note 1, at 591-92.
117. Menikoffet al., supra note 31, at 1165.
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Self-Determination Act, physicians, who are probably best prepared
to enter into extended discussions leading to informed patient
choices, are given no specific role. 118 Consequently, admissions per-
sonnel or anyone else a hospital appoints, may be responsible for in-
forming patients of their advance directive rights, and may not be
able to answer questions at all, let alone engage in a discussion tai-
lored to an individual's needs. It might be better to encourage phy-
sician involvement in this process, preferably in an office setting and
before a major health problem arises.
The 1989 Uniform Rights of The Terminally Ill Act'19 encour-
ages states to draft legislation regarding treatment refusal rights.
Unfortunately, this Act was not designed to apply to patients who
are not terminally ill or have not executed advance directives 20 and,
at least partly for this reason, no state has yet adopted it in its pris-
tine form.' 2' Consequently, there is still a great need for more uni-
formity among the states on these important issues.'2 2 Because of
the vast group of people and many situations on which the Act pro-
vides no guidance, the time has come for a similar act by the federal
government addressing these issues.
The most problematic difference among state statutes is the is-
sue of withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration. As discussed
previously, statutes should not distinguish this treatment from
other forms of life support.'23 Further, the definition of "life support"
118. Id.
119. UNIF. RIGHTS OF TERINALLY ILL ACT § 1, 9B U.L.A. 127 (Supp. 1994).
120. Suhr, supra note 79, at 1497. The author states:
The URTIA [Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act], however, is limited in
scope and provides no guidance for situations involving significant categories of
patients. The URTIA does not encompass minors, persons who have not exe-
cuted a declaration before becoming ill, adults who have never been capable of
executing medical directives, and non-terminal patients who will never regain
consciousness.
Id.
121. FURROW ET AL., supra note 60, at 1113. However, the Act does treat artificial
nutrition and hydration the same as other methods of life support, id. at 1122, therefore,
it is unfortunate that all the states did not adopt at least this part of the Act.
122. The decision of the United States Supreme Court to opt out of providing much
constitutional guidance to the states may create a crazy quilt of state laws such that a
patient who would have a "right to die" that could be exercised by his family in California
or New Jersey would not have that right (or would not have a right that could be exer-
cised by his family) in Missouri or New York. Id. at 1081.
123. "One of the most significant barriers to enforcement of an incompetent's wishes
through the proxy mechanism is the [common] requirement that the principal's prefer-
ences regarding artificial nutrition and hydration must be specified before his or her
agent is deemed to have the authority to decide these questions." Hollander, supra note
78, at 167. Unfortunately, this limitation on artificial nutrition and hydration has been
encouraged by many state statutes, including the original legislation proposed by the
New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, which did not address the issue at all
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should be simplified and used consistently across the country. Per-
haps the best definition of life support is any medical procedure or
intervention which, when administered to a patient, serves to pro-
long the process of dying.' The federal government should again
step in and provide some unified standards and definitions, since
large differences in these statutes may encourage "forum shop-
ping"125 and restrict the right to free travel among the states.26 Uni-
formity would also eliminate the problems inherent in executing an
advance directive in one state and then later moving to another
state with different requirements.
Besides uniformity, there are several specific, important
changes that need to occur in both law and education. Obviously,
physicians and other health care workers should be informed of new
laws and their corresponding responsibility to recognize advance di-
rectives and proxies. It is especially important to convey the mes-
sage that if physicians and health care workers follow advance di-
rectives they will be protected from liability. Additionally, health
care facilities which disagree with a patient's or family's wishes to
terminate life support should, in the very least, be required by legis-
lation to allow another physician to come into that facility to discon-
tinue the treatment when a transfer would be difficult.
Most importantly, state legislation needs to recognize and deal
with the fact that many individuals will never execute any form of
advance directive.2 7 "[MIany people may not see a need to complete
(thereby leaving intact the current statute which makes the distinction). Id. at 161, 167.
See also, AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 74, at Op. 2.18 and su-
pra note 63 and accompanying text.
124. This definition is adopted primarily from the Uniform Rights of the Terminally
Ill Act. Suhr, supra note 79, at 1517 & n.212; see also, ME. RsV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-
701 comment (West 1993) (discussing why Maine's legislators chose to simplify its defini-
tion and why other state statutes are confusing and problematic).
125. Early in 1991, the father and guardian of Christine Busalacchi sought to move
his vegetative daughter to a clinic outside of Missouri (for consultation with a nationally
known neurologist who happened to practice in a clinic which was not legally or ethically
opposed to withdrawal of life support). The state of Missouri sought an order forbidding
the move. The Missouri Court of Appeals determined that there was a need for a new
hearing on the reason for the move. The court feared that Mr. Busalucchi was just trying
to get his daughter into a state and clinic that would more easily permit the withdrawal
of life support: "we will not permit [the] guardian to forum shop in an effort to control
whether Christine lives or dies." FURROW ET AL., supra note 60, at 1082.
126. Id. at 1080-82. Also, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (discussing
the requirement that "all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of
our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or re-
strict this movement"). Id. at 629.
127. Even among the large percentage of the public who express an interest in con-
trolling their own care at the end of life, only a small proportion currently execute ad-
vance directives. Menikoffet al., supra note 31, at 1165 (footnote omitted).
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an advance directive; they may be relying on their family members
to make decisions for them when they are incompetent, and they
may believe (perhaps incorrectly) that this will take place even if
they fail to act."m In addition, even living wills do not help in deci-
sions for minors, infants, or patients who have never been mentally
competent.12
Currently, many states presume that patients want treatment,
"at any cost, monetary or personal - a conclusion that study after
study demonstrates is contrary to the wishes of the great majority of
the public."'30 This presumption results in thousands of incompe-
tent, unconscious patients being sustained, perhaps against their
will, causing needless family anxiety, clogging of the courts, uncom-
fortable and expensive legal delays, and the wasting of finite health
care dollars.'3 ' If an incompetent patient has not legally designated
a health care proxy, courts and the law should automatically recog-
nize a close family member (or friend if necessary) as surrogate de-
cision maker. 32 At least 28 states have laws of this sort, but others,
128. Id.
129. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Ethics: Analysis of Patient Self-determination Act, 268
JAMA 355 (1992).
130. Menikoffet al., supra note 31, at 1165.
131. Saving public resources is an important utilitarian benefit of advance direc-
tives. Their widespread use and implementation might well result in a reduction of ex-
pensive life-preserving medical machinery. Cantor, supra note 56, at 21.
At one county-run facility providing long-term care, there were more than 50
patients in a persistent vegetative state when the Illinois law [automatically
designating health care surrogates for incompetents] took effect, virtually none
of whom had executed advance directives. Under earlier Illinois law, even a
court-appointed guardian would have had to go to court to request the termina-
tion of artificial hydration or nutrition for one of these patients.
Menikoffet al., supra note 31, at 1168. In the case of In re Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Minn.
Dist. Ct., Probate Div., (1991)), the medical cost of maintaining Mrs. Wanglie (who was in
a PVS and on a respirator) was $45,000 per month; terminally ill patients account for a
disproportionately high percentage of medical costs. California, for example, fails to pro-
vide public health services, except for the very poor, and those who have insurance are
often restricted by limits. It is not uncommon for families to be forced to sell their homes
to pay for the medical treatment of a relative. Yuen, supra note 1, at 583 (footnote omit-
ted).
132. Suhr, supra note 79, at 1516. Florida and Illinois have recently enacted stat-
utes allowing family and friends to act as surrogate decision-makers in the absence of a
written proxy. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.401 (Supp. 1993), ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 755, § 40/25
(Smith-Hurd 1992). One solution that has been advocated is to reconceive the justification
for proxy decision making. The President's Commission and others maintain that even if
proxy decision makers cannot accurately predict the patient's preferences, social policy
should honor a family's "good faith" decisions based on the patient's "best interests." This
position is justified because "the family deserves recognition as an important social unit
that ought to be treated, within limits, as a responsible decision maker in matters that
ultimately affect its members"; because of the special "interpersonal union" among mem-
bers; and because families "grieve for the patient's suffering and death." Emanuel, supra
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like New York, assume a patient wants life support unless the fam-
ily can prove otherwise at the highest standard of proof.133 Unfortu-
nately, it may be necessary for more individuals with the power to
change state law to personally experience many of the problems dis-
cussed here before laws will change. New York's Governor Cuomo
has recently proposed new laws dealing with life support issues in
the wake of his personal struggle with his mother's incapacitation
due to a stroke over two years ago."
The four dissenting Justices in Cruzan would recognize the de-
cisions of a surrogate under appropriate circumstances; in her con-
currence Justice O'Connor suggests that the duty to give effect to
those decisions may well be constitutionally required.'35 Certainly,
studies have shown that surrogate decisions are not always perfect.
"Nonetheless, most of us would probably be more comfortable
knowing that our family and friends are taking care of us than hav-
ing such decisions made by bureaucrats, 3 6 or relying on a court to
find "clear and convincing" evidence of treatment wishes before life
support may be withdrawn.3 3 An analogy can be made to regular
wills. Only 25% of Americans execute testamentary wills, yet most
have some assets.3 8 Many people do not bother to execute wills be-
note 85, at 2070.
133. Better Law Needed to Help When Life Has Flown Away, BUFF. NEWS, Feb. 7,
1993, at G8. Hearings began in Albany, New York, in February 1993, debating a health
care surrogate bill prepared and pushed by the Task Force on Life and the Law. Id.
134. New York and Missouri are the only two states where the law explicitly denies
family members authority to make life support withdrawal decisions. Cuomo's proposed
law would enable family members to become surrogate decision makers. Nicholas Gold-
berg, A Time to Die - Cuomo Proposes Law to Allow Kin to Pull Life Support, NEWSDAY,
Mar. 12, 1993, at 3.
135. "M[The Court does not today decide the issue whether a State must also give ef-
fect to the decisions of a surrogate decisionmaker. In my view, such a duty may well be
constitutionally required to protect the patient's liberty interest in refusing medical
treatment." 497 U.S. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Otherwise States may frequently
fail to honor a patient's intent. Id. at 301 (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
136. Menikoffet al., supra note 31, at 1166.
137. In a scholarly and cogent review of the case law, the [New York State] Task
Force [on Life and the Law] illustrates how the doctrine of clear and convincing evidence
came to dominate surrogate decision making in New York. More importantly, the report
notes how this stringent criterion has failed to meet the needs of the incapacitated. Fins,
supra note 102, at 204-05.
Under the Task Force's proposal, surrogates would be authorized to make treatment
decisions for incapacitated patients without clear and convincing evidence of a patient's
wishes, and without a living will or health care proxy instrument. Bioethics review com-
mittees would make sure that the surrogate's decision reflected the patient's best inter-
ests, as well as making health care decisions for those without any family. However, the
provision for bioethics review committees seems to "undermine the deference which
should be accorded to family members who serve as surrogates." Id.
138. Menikoffet al., supra note 31, at 1165.
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cause the law provides a satisfactory failback: assets go to the family
anyway.1' 9 The same should be true for living wills; if a patient has
given no previous indication of her/his wishes, the family should
have the authority to decide life support issues. Legislation should
list family members in the order of authority and provide guidelines
for cases of intra-familial conflict, as in Illinois's statute discussed
previously in section IV. 140 If the family member blatantly demon-
strates that s/he does not have a patient's best interests in mind,
then the courts can intervene.1
4 1
Beyond the problems created by differences between state laws
and the individual shortcomings of state laws, there is the problem
that advance directives are useless unless the family, physicians,
and health care agents know of them ahead of time and are willing
to recognize them. If a health care agent is designated, an individual
should give the proxy as much information as possible regarding
what the individual's wishes are should s/he become incapaci-
tated. Also,
[tihe best way to avoid [the problem of 'third-party reluctance'] is to talk to
health care providers to make sure they understand the document and
have no objections to following it. If objections arise, [patients] need to
work them out, or... choose to change physicians. Once [an individual]
signs a[n advance directive], [s/he must] give a copy of it to [his or her] at-
tending physician.
143
Additionally, any type of advance directive should be indicated in
every patient's chart.
139. Id.
140. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, act. 40, § 45/4-1 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
141. Blatant disregard for a patient's best interests might be demonstrated by a
family member who does not visit the patient, who expresses obvious dislike for the pa-
tient, or who states that s/he is motivated by a possible death benefit. Clearly, not all
relatives who disregard a patient's best interests will be obvious about it. However, if a
health care worker senses an uncaring attitude on the part of the relative, s/he can al-
ways try to obtain a court order stopping the withdrawal of life support. The idea is to
take the burden of proof off the much more common caring relative who is concerned with
the patient's best interests. This will make it much easier for concerned families to decide
that a patient's interests would best be served by a dignified death.
The suspicion that families and physicians would fail to serve the needs of pa-
tients and loved ones, however, seems counterintuitive. Mandated approval of
decisions to withdraw or withhold burdensome life-sustaining therapy from pa-
tients who are neither terminally ill nor permanently unconscious seems to im-
properly question the standing and judgment of family and medical profession-
als. This skepticism seems particularly unfounded when surrogate and physi-
cian are in agreement about a course of action.
Fins, supra note 102 at 205.
142. McCormick, supra note 32, at 33.
143. Sabatino, supra note 115, at 34.
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Individuals need either to be educated or to educate themselves
regarding newly legislated rights to refuse treatment, dictate what
types of treatment they might wish in the event of incompetency,
and designate health care proxies. Physicians can do their part by
informing patients of new laws routinely, and lawyers can make in-
dividuals aware of these issues when clients request estate assis-
tance. Advance directives and proxy forms should be executed along
with testamentary wills. Despite the difficulties involved, the
"multiplicity of prospective medical situations" should not prevent
individuals from executing advance directives:
[although it might not be possible to formulate a comprehensive directive
which anticipates all possible situations because of the limits of one's
imagination, every competent person is capable of addressing a few pre-
cepts or guidelines regarding his future medical care. A person can articu-
late certain principles-whether grounded on religious scruples, personal
philosophy, or personal notions of dignity-which will be relevant across a
wide spectrum of medical conditions.
1 4
Individuals should be encouraged to execute both a living will and a
health care proxy, and to combine them in one document if possi-
ble.145 This way, one document cannot supersede the other, but will
necessitate dual consideration. A consolidated document, as well as
discussing issues with a proxy in advance, will insure that a surro-
gate decision maker adheres to specific guidelines, thereby making
it easier to represent the patient's wishes.14 Even if one or both
types of advance directives are uncertain or unrecognized in a par-
ticular state, a consolidated document will still carry substantial "moral
weight" if there is ever a question of an incompetent's best interests.147
144. Cantor, supra note 56, at 17.
145. Sabatino, supra note 115. "A designation may include a statement of the pa-
tient's desires on care, custody, and medical treatment." MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN.
§700.496 (West Supp. 1993).
146. Emanuel, supra note 85, at 2071. Alone, advance directives and substituted
judgments (either by proxies or another appointed surrogate decision maker) may both be
problematic. At times, there are good reasons to overrule advance directives, such as
when a new treatment could help a patient who did not anticipate the advancement in an
overly-specific living will. Also, surrogates may misconstrue or misrepresent the patienes
wishes because of serious financial or emotional conflicts of interest. "These difficulties
would seem to favor executing both instructional and proxy directives." Pellegrino, supra
note 129, at 355.
147. See Cantor, supra note 56, at 33.
Encouraging patients to execute advance directives is a worthy goal. Although
such documents are certainly not perfect and may in many instances be difficult
to interpret, it is usually much easier to determine and respect a patient's
wishes when there is an advance directive than when the patient has left no
indication of his or her wishes.
Menikoff et al., supra note 31, at 1165 (footnote omitted).
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In summary, there are two categories of problems that need to
be addressed in the realm of life support. First, individuals, hospi-
tals, and all health care workers need to be educated on their rights
and protections. Second, current state and federal laws fall short of
addressing all of the issues involved in the withdrawal of life sup-
port, breeding confusion, conflict, and too great a difference in the
rights of patients in different states to die with dignity. Education,
clarification of terms and concepts, and uniformity on the part of
state statutes, as well as laws ensuring that all patients will have
the right to withdraw life support, must be encouraged both by state
and federal action.
